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The fact that individuals will most likely behave differently in different situations begets the introduction of
conditional strategies. Inspired by this, we study the evolution of cooperation in the spatial public goods game,
where besides unconditional cooperators and defectors, also different types of conditional cooperators compete
for space. Conditional cooperators will contribute to the public good only if other players within the group are
likely to cooperate as well, but will withhold their contribution otherwise. Depending on the number of other
cooperators that are required to elicit cooperation of a conditional cooperator, the latter can be classified in as
many types as there are players within each group. We find that the most cautious cooperators, such that require
all other players within a group to be conditional cooperators, are the undisputed victors of the evolutionary pro-
cess, even at very low synergy factors. We show that the remarkable promotion of cooperation is due primarily
to the spontaneous emergence of quarantining of defectors, which become surrounded by conditional coopera-
tors and are forced into isolated convex “bubbles” from where they are unable to exploit the public good. This
phenomenon can be observed only in structured populations, thus adding to the relevance of pattern formation
for the successful evolution of cooperation.
PACS numbers: 89.75.Fb, 87.23.Ge, 87.23.Kg
I. INTRODUCTION
The origins of prosocial behavior in groups of unrelated in-
dividuals are difficult to trace down. There exist ample evi-
dence indicating that between-group conflicts may have been
instrumental for enhancing in-group solidarity [1]. On the
other hand, some argue that our pre-human ancestors may
have been confronted by more pressing challenges then sim-
ply to avoid being wiped out by their neighbors. About two
million years ago some hominids were beginning to evolve
larger brains and body size and to mature more slowly than
other apes, which likely procreated serious challenges in rear-
ing offspring that survived [2, 3]. Hence, alloparental care and
provisioning for someone else’s young have also been pro-
posed as viable for igniting the evolution of the remarkable
other-regarding abilities of the genus Homo that we witness
today [4]. Regardless of its origins, it is a fact that cooperation
in groups is crucial for the remarkable evolutionary success of
the human species, and it is therefore of the outmost impor-
tance to identify mechanisms that might have spurred its later
development [5].
Evolutionary game theory [6–10] is firmly established as
the theoretical framework of choice for those studying the
emergence and sustainability of cooperation at different lev-
els of organization [11]. Recent reviews attest clearly to the
fact that interdisciplinary approaches, linking together knowl-
edge from biology, sociology, economics as well as mathe-
matics and physics, are especially successful in identifying
new ways by means of which the successful evolution of co-
operation amongst selfish and unrelated individuals can be un-
derstood [12–16]. The public goods game, in particular, has
proven itself times and again as the classic paradigm that suc-
cinctly captures the essential social dilemma that emerges as
a consequence of group and individual interests being inher-
ently different, which may ultimately result in the “tragedy of
the commons” [17]. Governed by group interactions, the pub-
lic goods game requires that players decide simultaneously
whether they wish to contribute to the common pool, i.e. to
cooperate, or not. Regardless of the chosen strategy, each
member of the group receives an equal share of the public
good after the initial investments are multiplied by a synergy
factor that takes into account the added value of collaborative
efforts. Evidently, individuals are best off by not contribut-
ing anything to the common pool, i.e. by defecting, while the
group, and indeed the society as a whole, is most successful if
everybody cooperates.
Recent research has made it clear that spatial structure plays
a pivotal role by the evolution of cooperation, as comprehen-
sively reviewed in [14]. Inspired by the seminal paper intro-
ducing games on grids [18], evolutionary games on graphs
and complex networks [19–37] have proven instrumental in
raising the awareness of the fact that relaxing the simplifica-
tion of well-mixed interactions may lead to qualitatively dif-
ferent results that are due to pattern formation and intricate
organization of the competing strategies, which reveals itself
in most unexpected ways. Specifically for the spatial public
goods game [38, 39], it has recently been shown that inhomo-
geneous player activities [40], appropriate partner selection
[41, 42], diversity [43–45], the critical mass [46], heteroge-
neous wealth distributions [47], the introduction of punish-
ment [48, 49] and reward [50], as well as both the joker [51]
and the Matthew effect [52], can all substantially promote the
evolution of public cooperation.
Apart from rare exceptions, the large majority of previously
published works assumed unconditional strategies, i.e. co-
operators that always cooperated and defectors that always
defected. Nevertheless, the usage of unconditional strategies
constitutes a simplification that deserves further exploration.
It is a fact that individuals, be it humans or animals, will likely
behave differently under different circumstances. This invites
the introduction of conditional strategies, by means of which
such considerations can be appropriately taken into account.
With this motivation, we here study the evolution of cooper-
ation in the spatial public goods game containing conditional
2cooperators. Conditional cooperators will contribute to the
common pool only if there is a sufficiently high number of
other conditional cooperators in the group. If not, conditional
cooperators will defect, at least until the group acquires more
players that are likely to cooperate. While the details of the
model and the main results will be presented in the follow-
ing two sections, beforehand, the key finding of this work
is that conditional cooperators are able to quarantine defec-
tors into isolated convex “bubbles” from where they are un-
able to exploit the public good, and in doing so warrant com-
pletely defector-free states even if the synergy factor is close
to one. Perhaps even more interestingly, we find that just the
signalling of the willingness to cooperate, instead of a hard
promise, is sufficient to elevate the level of collaborative ef-
forts. As we will show, these observations rely on the spatial
structure and cannot be observed in well-mixed systems, al-
though they are robust against the topological variations of
the interaction network and the group size.
II. SPATIAL PUBLIC GOODS GAME WITH
CONDITIONAL STRATEGIES
The public goods game is staged on a square lattice with
periodic boundary conditions where L2 players are arranged
into overlapping groups of size G = 5 such that everyone is
connected to its G − 1 nearest neighbors. Accordingly, each
individual belongs to g = 1, . . . , G different groups. Initially
each player on site x is designated either as a conditional co-
operator (sx = Ci), where i = 0, . . . , G − 1, or defector
(sx = D) with equal probability. Conditional cooperators
contribute a fixed amount (here considered being equal to 1
without loss of generality) to the public good only if there are
at least i other players within the group g who are also will-
ing to cooperate (whose strategy is C0, C1, C2, C3 or C4)
while defectors contribute nothing. Formally C0 thus returns
unconditional cooperators C while CG returns unconditional
defectorsD. Note that in the presence of a player having strat-
egy sx = CG there cannot be G other conditional cooperators
within a group. The sum of all contributions in each group
is multiplied by the synergy factor r and the resulting public
goods are distributed equally amongst all the group members
irrespective of their contributions.
Monte Carlo simulations of the game are carried out com-
prising the following elementary steps. A randomly selected
player x plays the public goods game with its G − 1 part-
ners as a member of all the g groups, whereby its overall
payoff Psx is thus the sum of all the payoffs acquired in the
five groups. Next, player x chooses one of its nearest neigh-
bors at random, and the chosen co-player y also acquires its
payoff Psy in the same way. Finally, player x enforces its
strategy sx onto player y with a probability w(sx → sy) =
1/{1 + exp[(Psy − Psx)/K]}, where K = 0.5 quantifies the
uncertainty by strategy adoptions [39], implying that better
performing players are readily adopted, although it is not im-
possible to adopt the strategy of a player performing worse.
Such errors in decision making can be attributed to mistakes
and external influences that adversely affect the evaluation of
the opponent. Each Monte Carlo step (MCS) gives a chance
for every player to enforce its strategy onto one of the neigh-
bors once on average. The average densities of conditional
cooperators (ρi) and defectors (ρD, alternatively denoted as
C5 and ρ5) were determined in the stationary state after suffi-
ciently long relaxation times. Depending on the actual condi-
tions (proximity to phase transition points and the typical size
of emerging spatial patterns) the linear system size was varied
from L = 180 to 720 and the relaxation time was varied from
104 to 106 MCS to ensure proper accuracy.
It is worth pointing out that this is not a threshold-type
model because the goods will always be shared between all
the group members, even if the conditional cooperators will
not all contribute. We note that the condition for conditional
cooperators to cooperate introduced above is the most soft in
terms of how many players are actually expected to cooper-
ate. More precisely, it is likely that a very cautious coop-
erator (with a high i value) will not cooperate, even though
it may itself be reason enough for a less cautious cooperator
to do so. Hence, in our model conditional cooperators re-
quire only a positive signal, or what can be interpreted as an
“easy promise” from other group members, rather than a def-
inite mutual agreement to contribute to the common pool. A
much more stricter and sophisticated condition would be that
a player having sx = Ci will cooperate only if there are at
least i other players in the group whose index is less or equal
to i. This rule, imposing thus much stricter conditions, can
only be applied if there is also at least one CG player (un-
conditional defector) in the group. Note that without it this
definition yields misleading commands to conditional defec-
tors. For example, in a group containing players C0, C3, C3,
C4 and C4, the strict Ci ≤ Cj rule would dictate defection for
all C3 players. In the following, we will refer to the dynam-
ics relying on the “more careful” conditional strategies as the
strict rule. We will comment on the outcome of such and other
alternative models in the next section, where we now proceed
with presenting the main results.
III. RESULTS
It is instructive to first examine the evolution of a subset of
all the possible strategies. Figure 1 shows the outcomes of
three-strategy games, where besides the unconditional coop-
erators C0 and defectors CG = D one conditionally coopera-
tive strategy (C1, C2, C3 or C4) is initially present. Depicted
is the stationary density of defectors ρD versus the synergy
factor r for the four possible strategy triples, as well as for
the traditional two-strategy version of the spatial public goods
game (C0 curve). In the latter case, cooperators die out at
r ≤ 3.748, which is a well-known result [39]. Additionally
introducing one type of conditional cooperators to the tradi-
tional setup continuously decreases the minimally required r
for cooperative behavior to survive as i increases. Most re-
markably, if initially unconditional cooperatorsC0 and defec-
tors CG = D and conditional cooperators C4 each occupy
1/3 of the lattice, we find that defectors cannot survive even
in the r → 1 limit (C4 curve). This indicates that simple con-
3 0.0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1.0
 1  2  3  4  5  6
ρ D
r
C0C1C2C3
C4
FIG. 1: (Color online) The fraction of defectors ρD as a function
of the synergy factor r, as obtained for different combinations of
strategies that compete for space on the square lattice. Besides pure
cooperators (C) and defectors (D), 1/3 of the lattice is initially oc-
cupied by one conditionally cooperative strategy (Ci), as marked by
each depicted curve. It can be observed that the higher the value of
i, the earlier (at lower r) the downfall of ρD . Remarkably, if the
most cautious conditional cooperators are introduced (C4), defectors
are completely defeated irrespective of r. We note that the results
obtained with the related 3-strategy strict rule model are identical.
ditional strategies have ample potential for elegantly avoiding
the “tragedy of the commons” even under the worst of condi-
tions.
The critical value of r where cooperators die out can be esti-
mated by means of a simple approach that considers the com-
petition between two ordered domains of strategies [53]. As
Fig. 2 illustrates, the elementary change which modifies the
step-like interface between competing domains is an invasion
across the dashed line between unequal strategies. Assuming
Cj players as conditional cooperators and unconditional de-
fectors, the accumulated payoffs of competing players are as
follows:
r
G
G−1∑
i=j+1
i =
r
G
G∑
i=j+1
i− (G− j) . (1)
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FIG. 2: (Color online) Schematic presentation supporting the inter-
face stability analysis of competing domains. The leading process,
which modifies the interface between the ordered domains more in-
tensively, is the invasion across the border marked by the dashed line.
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FIG. 3: (Color online) Time evolution of the complete six-strategy
public goods game with unconditional cooperators (C0) and defec-
tors (C5) as well as the four conditionally cooperative strategies (C1,
C2, C3 and C4), as obtained for r = 1.05. As can be deduced
from results presented in Fig. 1, at such low synergy factors all but
the C4 strategy are outperformed by defectors. However, after the
defector-induced extinction of C0...3, the most cautious conditional
cooperators (C4) are able to completely invade the defectors (C5).
Inset shows the same evolution as obtained if using the strict rule
model, and it can be observed that the final outcome is the same.
From this equation the critical synergy factor for the condi-
tional cooperator strategy Cj is rjc = G − j. Thus, even
this simple analysis is able to reproduce the decreasing critical
values of rc by increasing j, and moreover, warns that uncon-
ditional defectors cannot exist if a CG−1 strategy is present.
Evidently, other elementary processes are also possible, but
their contributions to the boundary velocity are smaller, and to
consider them would make this analysis untraceable. What is
important is to note that the result is independent of the group
size G, and is qualitatively valid for all lattice types. This
is a straightforward consequence of the multi-point interac-
tion of public goods games, which diminishes several micro-
scopic differences of graphs and makes topological features
like the clustering coefficient irrelevant [39]. The latter are,
of course, essential for games that are governed by pair-wise
interactions [14]. As evidenced by the stability analysis, the
crucial property in the presently studied model, however, is
the “spatiality”, allowing interfaces that separate domains of
different strategies, which can only be fulfilled in structured
populations.
Turning to the complete six-strategy version of the spatial
public goods game, we find that our main conclusion, arrived
at based on the analysis of different three-strategy games, re-
mains fully valid. In Fig. 3, we first present characteristic
time courses of all six strategies over time as obtained for a
very low value of r. As expected based on results presented
in Fig. 1, unconditional cooperators C0, as well conditional
cooperators C1, C2 and C3, albeit marginally latter, all die
out fast due to invading defectors C5. However, after the de-
fectors are left on their own with C4, they cannot withstand
the invasion of this strain of conditional cooperators and die
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FIG. 4: (Color online) Time evolution of the complete six-strategy
public goods game with unconditional cooperators (C0) and defec-
tors (C5) as well as the four conditionally cooperative strategies (C1,
C2, C3 and C4), as obtained for r = 4.5. At such a high synergy
factor all five cooperative strategies C0...4 are able to withstand be-
ing wiped out by defectors. In fact, the latter are forced to extinction
primarily by C4, and to a much lesser extend by C3. As soon as
defectors die out, however, all cooperative strategies become equiva-
lent, and their evolution becomes identical to that of the voter model.
As in Fig. 3, the inset shows the same outcome for the strict rule
model.
out. Interestingly, although C4 appear to be eating into the
territory of defectors from the very beginning of the evolu-
tionary process, their full potential is unleashed only after all
the other “less cautious” conditional cooperators die out. This
is because althoughC4 are obviously impervious to defectors,
this is not necessarily the case with regards to other condi-
tionally cooperative strategies. In particular, it may well be
that under certain circumstances the lesser criteria for when
to cooperate may yield a temporary advantage of C0...3 over
C4. Thus in fact, the other cooperative strategies hinder C4
at effectively invading defectors by invading C4 themselves.
This, however, is very short lived as defectors are able to in-
vade C0...3 extremely effectively at r → 1. In a rather twisted
turn of events, defectors, by invading C0...3, actually pave the
way themselves towards a premature extinction. Although
one could thus, in principle a least, hypothesize an alliance
between C0...3 and C5 = D to successfully invade C4, our
simulations reveal that the evolutionary window for such a
complicated alliance to remain stable is too small to exist.
At high synergy factors, however, the outcome of the six-
strategy public goods game is significantly different. As evi-
denced by results presented in Fig. 4, at r = 4.5 all the coop-
erative strategies are able to withstand being invaded by de-
fectors. In fact, both C4 and to a substantially lesser degree
C3 are able to do the exact opposite, which is to gain ground
on the expense of retreating C5 = D. Importantly, however,
after the defectors die out all five remaining strategies C0...4
become completely equivalent. Note that due to the soft con-
dition, requiring only the presence of a certain number of con-
ditional cooperator within the group, but regardless of their
type (see Section II for detail), all group members now receive
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FIG. 5: (Color online) Fixation probabilities Pf of the complete six-
strategy game to eventually arrive at a pure Ci phase in dependence
on the synergy factor r. It can be observed that while at r → 1 the
fixation at C4 is practically unavoidable, in the high r limit all five
cooperative strategies (C0...4) become equally probable as the victors
of the evolutionary process. Importantly, regardless of r defectors are
unable to survive, let alone dominate.
the required number of positive signals from others to actually
go ahead and contribute to the common pool. Henceforth, the
evolution becomes identical to that of the voter model [54],
entailing logarithmically slow coarsening in the absence of
surface tension [55]. The final stationary state is thus deter-
mined primarily by the share of the square lattice that is occu-
pied by any given strategy at the time of defector extinction.
This interpretation can be made more precise by determin-
ing the fixation probabilities of the cooperative strategies in
dependence on r. Results presented in Fig. 5 indicate that,
because of the neutral relations between the five cooperative
strategies, which set in after the defector die out, the govern-
ing voter-model dynamics will, through coarsening, result in
a homogeneous state where the system fixates into one of the
remaining Ci strategies, where i < G. The fixation probabil-
ity depends on the fraction of competing strategies at the time
of ρD → 0, which in turn depend on the effectiveness of the
cooperative strategies to invade unconditional defectors, and
to a lesser degree also on their effectiveness to invade each
other. Based on the time evolutions presented in Figs. 3 and 4,
it is understandable that at low values of r the fixation proba-
bility of C4 will be practically one, while in the opposite limit
the eventual dominance of either cooperative strain will be
equally probable (see Fig. 5).
In order to reveal the main mechanism behind the rather re-
markable inability of defectors to survive in the presence of
C4, it is instructive to visualize the spatial patterns emerging
as a consequence of their direct competition. Figure 6 features
a series of four characteristic snapshots that were taken at dif-
ferent times [increasing from panel (a) to panel (d)] where
only the two mentioned strategies compete for space. While
defectors are depicted black, for convenience we graphically
distinguish between two types ofC4 players. Namely between
such that are predominantly active as cooperators, and such
5c d
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FIG. 6: (Color online) Characteristic snapshots depicting the compe-
tition between conditional cooperators C4 and unconditional defec-
tors C5 = D when starting from a random initial state, as obtained
for r = 1.05. Black are C5, white are C4 when they cooperate
in at least three out of five groups, while light blue (gray if printed
BW) are C4 that cooperate in less than three of the five groups where
they are members. The snapshots were taken at 0 (a), 10 (b), 30 (c)
and 100 (d) full Monte Carlo steps (MCS). The final state is a pure
C4 phase (all players depicted white), which is not shown. It can
be observed that initially all the cooperators are practically inactive
or hidden [light blue and black dominates in panel (a)]. Only after
the spatial reciprocity takes effect and first cooperative clusters are
formed do the conditional cooperators actually start cooperating, al-
though they do so only in the interior of the clusters [see panel (b)].
At the borders separating the two competing strategies, however, vir-
tually all C4 remain inactive as they are unable to gather the required
number of positive signals from their neighbors [see panel (c)]. This
thin intermediate layer of hidden and inactive C4 then acts as a shield
that makes it incredibly difficult for defectors to invade. In fact, de-
fectors become effectively quarantined into “bubbles” from where
they are unable to exploit cooperators [see panel (d) and Fig. 7 for a
zoom-in]. Ultimately, this mechanism results in the “tragedy of the
defectors” irrespective of the value of r. The linear system size used
here is L = 200.
that are predominantly inactive or hidden. The criterion sep-
arating the two is simply the number of groups in which the
player has actually contributed to the common pool. If the
player, at the time the snapshot was taken, has cooperated in
three or more out of the five groups where it is member, we
mark it as active and depict it white, while otherwise, if it
has cooperated in two or fewer groups, we mark it as inac-
tive and depict it light blue (gray if printed BW). With this
graphical distinction, we reveal that the reason why defectors
cannot exploit C4 effectively is due to the spontaneous emer-
gence of very persistent interfaces of inactive C4 players that
separate cooperative and defective domains. Since C4 play-
ers immediately stop cooperating in a group that contains at
least one C5 = D, the defectors cannot collect large, com-
FIG. 7: (Color online) An 80× 80 zoom-in of Fig. 6(d), demonstrat-
ing clearly the spontaneous emergence of convex isolated “bubbles”
of defectors (depicted black) that are contained by inactive condi-
tional cooperators of type C4 (depicted light blue, gray if printed
BW). While the latter will predominantly cooperate with the bulk
of active conditional cooperators of the same type (depicted white),
they will certainly defect in the opposite direction where there are
unconditional defectors. Consequently, defectors cannot exploit C4
type players, which leads to a gradual but unavoidable shrinkage of
the defector quarantines.
petitive payoffs near the interfaces (and certainly not in the
middle of the sea of D). On the other hand, hidden cooper-
ators are still capable to collect significant payoffs from C4
players that are on the opposite side of the interface, where in
general the condition to actually cooperate will be fulfilled. In
this way, hidden cooperators don’t just shield the active co-
operators from the invasion of defectors, but they can also ef-
fectively invade defectors to eventually completely dominate
the whole population. The phalanx of hidden cooperators will
quarantine unconditional defectors into convex isolated “bub-
bles”, as demonstrated in Fig. 7, which ultimately leads to an
unavoidable “tragedy of the defectors”.
From the described workings of the mechanism, it is clear
that it cannot emerge under well-mixed conditions, as then
players adopting theC4 strategy will essentially never actually
cooperate, given that an encounter with at least one defector is
virtually unavoidable. Despite of this factC4s can survive, but
they will always reveal only their defector face. Accordingly,
the “tragedy of the commons” cannot be avoided by means
of similar conditional strategies in well-mixed settings of the
public goods game. On the other hand, it is also clear that the
mechanism is robust and potent not only on the square lattice,
but in fact on all other types of interaction graphs where long-
standing bonds between players are assumed (note that certain
coevolutionary rules [16], especially such that rely on frequent
rewiring of the links between players, may render the mech-
anism dysfunctional). Finally, we emphasize another positive
message of this study, which is that cooperation can be pro-
moted simply by the signaling of others that they are willing
to cooperate, rather than a firm oath that they will actually
do so. We have observed that our results remain valid also
6when introducing the more sophisticated conditional strate-
gies, as discussed in Section II, although we find the usage of
the more elegant and simple model much more rewarding and
interesting.
IV. SUMMARY
In summary, we have shown that an intuitive introduction of
conditional cooperative strategies provides the ultimate boost
to the mechanism of spatial reciprocity [18]. In particular, the
most cautious conditional cooperators provide an escape hatch
out of the “tragedy of the commons” for all values of the syn-
ergy factor r by spontaneously forming a protective shield be-
tween them and the defectors. The shield, however, makes it
not only extremely difficult for defectors to exploit the collab-
orative efforts of others, but at the same time provides an evo-
lutionary advantage to cooperators that enables their invasion
of the territory of defectors, eventually leading to their com-
plete dominance. The quarantining of defectors is crucial es-
pecially at very low values of r, where otherwise they can reap
huge benefits on the expense of cooperators. At intermediate
and high values of r, however, all the different strains of con-
ditional cooperators become more and more able to withstand
being wiped out by defectors on their own. Thus, as soon as
defectors die out, the evolution of the remaining cooperative
strategies become neutral and proceeds by means of coars-
ening that is characteristic for the voter-model-type dynam-
ics [55]. By determining the fixation probabilities in depen-
dence on the synergy factor r, we have shown that in the low
r limit the fixation at C4 (the most cautious conditional co-
operators) is practically unavoidable, while in the high r limit
all five cooperative strategies (C0...4) become equally proba-
ble to emerge as the dominant trait. Regardless of r, however,
the defectors are unable to survive the evolutionary process,
which is a very rewarding discovery to arrive at simply by
means of a conditional strategy (C4). Conceptually at least,
our approach can be related to a recent study by Vukov et al.
[56], where directed investments were introduced to the public
goods game. In their model, however, a cooperator will nec-
essarily invest somewhere, while in our case cooperators may
remain dormant for long periods of time before eventually de-
ciding to contribute to the common pool. In terms of poten-
tial implication of our findings, apart from their relevance for
the successful evolution of prosocial behavior between selfish
and unrelated individuals, from the biological point of view,
the way inactive cooperators quarantine defectors and force
them into convex isolated “bubbles” bears resemblance to the
way the immune system works when trying to contain an in-
fection [57]. We hope that this study will inspire future re-
search aimed at investigating the role of conditional strategies
in structured populations.
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